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1 The  history  of  the  influences  and  interactions  between  pragmatism  and  the  social
sciences is as rich as it has been neglected as a field of research. This volume – the first
of a series of two – tries to explore both historically and theoretically some of these
multiple relationships, building upon the assumption that pragmatism has been one of
the philosophical traditions that have taken most seriously the study of the social. In
fact, since its origins classical American pragmatism has been a philosophy resolutely
open to the social sciences. Not only pragmatists have been actively engaged in social
scientific research themselves (think of W. James, J. Dewey, G. H. Mead, C. Morris), but
they have also conceived of the birth and development of the social sciences as one of
the most innovative traits of modern society, the one truly capable of incarnating the
pragmatist  conception of  the  scope of  knowledge within human experience.  It  was
mostly to social sciences, in fact, that pragmatist philosophers, social scientists, and
reformers such as J. Dewey, W. E. B. Du Bois, L. Trilling, S. Hook, W. Mills turned to in
order to find the analytical categories that could make philosophical thinking more
attuned to the transformations changing contemporary societies. At the same time, the
social sciences have always looked at pragmatism as a philosophy that offers useful
critical tools for making sense of social, cultural and political practices and institutions.
2 If we look at this rich exchange from the perspective of pragmatism as a philosophical
tradition, the following two dimensions are worth noticing. The first concerns the very
idea of what is philosophy, what are its main goals, which are its methods. Contrary to
what had been done in philosophy before pragmatism and contrary to what will be
done  afterwards,  the  pragmatists have  shaped  their  philosophical  understanding
through a dialogue with the social sciences. Indeed, pragmatism evolved at a time when
the social sciences – most notably sociology, psychology, anthropology and economics –
were beginning to differentiate themselves from the common tree of philosophy. The
pragmatists have generally been aware of the great potential embedded in the new
social  sciences.  James  and  Mead  travelled  to  Europe  to  learn  about  the  new
experimental  psychology  to  which  they  contributed  in  a  significant  manner,  while
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Dewey never tired to celebrate the importance of the social sciences in thinking and
giving shape to a more inclusive, just and human world. In addition, one has to remark
that pragmatism itself  as a philosophy was developed and deeply influenced by the
epistemological rupture brought about by the genesis and disciplinary constitution of
the social sciences: at a time when most of the European philosophical traditions were
looking  at  the  hard  sciences  as  the  new  paradigm  for  a  scientific  philosophy,
pragmatism saw in the rise of the social sciences a new approach to the understanding
and the control of social life. For a philosophical tradition determined to severe the
ancient bond with the representational conception of knowledge, the social sciences
were delivering materials and methods pointing toward an engaged, transformational
and emancipatory conception of philosophy: the new sciences of education, society,
politics,  urban  studies,  social  psychology  and  anthropology  offered  pragmatist
philosophers new understandings of the role of, as well as of the nature of, philosophy
as an academic discipline. While the self image of mainstream European and American
philosophy was being shaped by its ancillary dependence from the hard sciences and
while  the  new social  sciences  were  shaping  their  identity  through the  disciplinary
opposition  to  philosophy,  pragmatists  were  trying  to  explore  the  unbeaten  and
uncertain path of a social philosophy that wished to blur the institutional boundaries
between  science  and  practice,  descriptive  and  normative  sciences,  knowledge  and
action, academic research and active engagement. This program, as some of the papers
included in this volume show, is gaining new currency.
3 A second lesson that pragmatism has learnt from the social sciences has been to take
the social  dimension seriously.  The social  sciences taught pragmatists how to think
about the social, how to incorporate the social dimension in their educational, political,
logical,  and  aesthetic  thought.  This  is  mostly  visible  in  Dewey’s  and  Mead’s
philosophies. But the importance of the social dimension can also be easily traced back
to  James’s  thought,  and  –  though  less  distinctly  –  to  Peirce’s  conception  of  social
impulse and his notion of the social dimension of inquiry. This theme, so powerfully
chased out of philosophy for more than fifty years, is becoming prominent again, which
helps  explaining  the  growing  interest  among  philosophers  of  different  kinds  in
pragmatism. At a time when so many are turning to the practices and to the social as
central explanatory philosophical categories, one should perhaps give a fresh look to
the pragmatist texts, where the epistemological primacy of practices and the centrality
of the social had so powerfully been articulated well before the practices and the social
were (re)-discovered.
4 At the same time, one can see that this process of learning has proceeded also in the
opposite  direction.  In  what  concerns  the  contributions  of  American  philosophical
pragmatism to the social sciences, four main ideas can be singled out. The first has to
do with the conception of human beings as meaning-making organisms. Human beings
relate with the surrounding environment (including physical  and social  objects),  as
well as the past and the future, by means of the symbolic representations they make of
those  objects  and  categories.  The  social  order,  no  less  than the  moral,  political  or
economic orders, thus has an inextricably symbolic character. However, contrary to the
social constructivism that dominated social sciences discourse from the 1980s onwards,
which often portrayed human agency as uncoerced, classical philosophical pragmatism
has always insisted upon the constitutive nature of these symbolic constructions: in
other words, human agency is simultaneously enabled and constrained by institutions
such as the state – states allow for more complex forms of cooperative life than any
Pragmatism and the Social Sciences
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, III-2 | 2011
2
other  organizational  arrangement  but  can  be,  nevertheless,  extremely  powerful
sources of coercion. This important insight is usually accompanied by an interest in
language. Especially after the 1960s, social scientists gradually become more interested
in  human  linguistic  forms  of  communication,  from  the  post-structuralist  view  of
discourse  as  a  form  of  power  and  domination  to  the  critical  theory’s  interest  in
disentangling communicative forms of action and rationality from their strategic and
instrumental  counterparts.  Again,  as  the  case  of  the  discourse  ethics  developed by
Jürgen Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel  illustrates,  the influence of  classical  American
philosophical pragmatism was pivotal. In this issue, almost every paper touches upon
at least one of these contributions. But pragmatism’s contributions extend beyond the
emphasis on language and the symbolic nature of reality. 
5 As  a  process philosophy,  pragmatism  has  exerted  a  notable  influence  upon  those
interested in superseding rigid dualistic modes of thinking. In disciplines like sociology
or political science the pervasiveness of dualisms such as individual/society or mind/
body has been a reality for the better part of the last century. Critical voices within
those disciplines have often found in pragmatism an important ally to overcome such
dualistic modes of thinking. A good example of this tendency is James Johnson’s article,
where he questions a number of persisting dualisms in political science (more below). A
final  relevant  contribution  of  philosophical  pragmatism  to  contemporary  social
sciences refers to the crucial link between science and democracy. A classical theme
among pragmatists  such  as  Dewey  or  Mead,  the  emphasis  on  the  internal  relation
between science as a problem-solving cooperative activity and democracy as a form of
life has been appropriated and reconstructed by, among others, deliberative democrats
of  the  Habermasian  sort.  As  such,  pragmatism  has  been  a  shaping  force  in
contemporary  political  theory.  These  are,  of  course,  but  a  few  examples  of  the
contributions made by pragmatism to work in the social sciences. But they suffice to
help us make the point that social scientists, both more empirically or theoretically
oriented, in the US and elsewhere, have been drawing upon the intellectual resources
of  American  philosophical  pragmatism  in  various  ways.  Though  never  a  dominant
influence in mainstream social science, pragmatism has nevertheless proved to be a
valuable  ally  for  those  willing  to  critically  engage  with  those  dominant  modes  of
thinking.
6 The way we have organized this  issue  reflects  this  particular  mode of  engagement
between philosophical pragmatism and the social sciences. The issue is composed of
three main sections. The first includes papers that offer general reflections upon the
various ways in which pragmatism has influenced social  science research.  As noted
above, although pragmatism was never a central influence in the social sciences over
the course of the twentieth century, pragmatist ideas did impact certain social fields
and  sub-disciplines.  A  case  in  point  is  the  sociological  tradition  of  symbolic
interactionism (SI), whose philosophical tenets are explicitly pragmatist. But this can
hardly be said to have been the case in other sociological traditions, let alone in other,
more “positive,” social sciences, such as economics or political science. This is exactly
where  Peter  Manicas,  with  his  “American  Social  Science:  The  Irrelevance  of
Pragmatism”,  starts  off.  Manicas  builds  his  case  against  a  “good  deal  of  received
opinion”  according  to  which  American  pragmatism has  been  a  strong  influence  in
social sciences in the US. His argument is that there is hardly any evidence to support
such a  claim.  On the  contrary,  mainstream American social  science  has  evolved in
relative isolation from the ideas of pragmatist authors such as Peirce, James and Dewey.
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Pragmatism was simply incompatible with the positivistic outlook of the mainstream.
Yet, now that positivism has definitively declined, Manicas believes that there is much
for social scientists in America to learn from the only philosophical tradition created
and developed in that country. The second paper is by Patrick Baert and is entitled
“Neo-Pragmatism and Phenomenology: A Proposal.” Here we are offered a pragmatist-
inspired  proposal  for  a  philosophy  of  social  sciences  that  rejects  foundationalism,
naturalism  and representationalism  while  emphasizing  self-understanding.  Baert’s
strategy  is  to  reconcile  American  philosophical  pragmatism  with  the  work  of  the
Continental European hermeneutics of Gadamer, Levinas and Sartre, something he does
very  convincingly.  His  neo-pragmatist  social  theory  is  one  of  the  most  innovative
approaches in the field today.  The first  group of  papers ends with Eugene Halton’s
“Pragmatic E-Pistols,” were we are offered a number of imaginary letters addressed to
several key figures of classical American philosophical pragmatism, including William
James, Charles Peirce, George Herbert Mead, and John Dewey. Especially noteworthy is
the  way  in  which  Halton  intertwines  his  own  ideas  with  those  of  his  imaginary
addressees thus bringing those “classics” ideas back to the present. 
7 If this first group of papers discusses the relatively marginal role of pragmatist ideas in
the development of social science, the second group revolves around the question of
how pragmatism has nevertheless helped empowering various marginalized groups in
society.  In  this  second group of  contributions,  politically  hot  issues  such as  power,
legality, politics and social exclusion are addressed. The first paper, by Susan Haack, is
entitled “Pragmatism, Law, and Morality: The Lessons of Buck v. Bell” and it discusses
the key pragmatist ideas by reference to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ legal thinking
and practice. In particular, she offers a detailed analysis of the 1927 Buck vs. Bell case,
in which the forced sterilization of an institutionalized woman, Carrie Buck, was at
stake. By a majority of 8-1, the Supreme Court decided that sterilizing Carrie Buck did
not constitute a violation of her fundamental constitutional rights. The fact that was
Holmes who wrote the ruling for the majority provides Haack with an opportunity to
discuss  at  length  the  potentials  and  limitations  of  legal  pragmatism.  This  relation
between philosophical ideas and pressing real-world legal and moral issues, such as
those raised by the eugenics programs implemented in the US and various European
countries  from the  early  twentieth  century  well  into  the  1970s,  ties  in  nicely  with
Patricia  Hill  Collins’s  “Piecing Together  a  Genealogical  Puzzle:  Intersectionality  and
American Pragmatism.” As Collins explains, intersectionality, a term first coined in the
late 1980s by the critical race theorist Kimberlé Crenshaw, is a “knowledge project”
that revolves around a number of shared ideas, namely “(1) how race, class, gender and
sexuality constitute intersecting systems of power; (2) how specific social inequalities
that reflect these power relations from one setting to the next; (3) how identities of
race, gender, are socially constructed within multiple systems of power; and (4) how
social  problems  and  their  remedies  are  similarly  constructed  within  intersecting
systems of power.” A genealogy of this intersectionalist discourse in American social
sciences  is  then  systematically  confronted  with  the  genealogy  of  pragmatist  ideas
around three key issues,  experience,  social  inequalities and social  action. From this
genealogical reconstruction, Collins is then able to identify a number of paths not yet
taken  by  either  theoretical  tradition,  in  what  must  certainly  be  one  of  the  most
valuable contributions in this issue. A similar concern with bringing excluded voices
into the academic conversation is found in Bill Lawson’s “Of President Barack H. Obama
and Others: Public Policy, Race-talk, and Pragmatism.” Focusing on the case of African-
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Americans, Lawson makes use of W. E. B. Du Bois’s seminal 1903 Souls of Black Folk to
critically re-examine Barack Obama’s color-blind public policies. Lawson’s claim is that
Obama’s  universalistic  approach  will  have  a  detrimental  impact  on  the  social  and
economic  standing  of  African  Americans.  One  solution  to  such  an  unintended  and
undesired consequence is a pragmatic understanding of race, which would help Obama
to see why we still need both race-talk and race conscious policies. Race, socioeconomic
inequality, and human rights are but three examples of a critical agenda in the social
sciences  that  philosophical  pragmatism  has  been  helping  to  foster  in  the  US  and
abroad. 
8 This  examination  of  the  ways  in  which  practitioners  outside  philosophy  have
appropriated pragmatist ideas is continued in the final section of the issue, where the
cases of sociology, social psychology, political science, economics, and psychiatry are
discussed.  In  his  paper  “Towards  a  social  externalism:  Pragmatism  and
ethnomethodology,” Louis Queré offers us a stimulating analysis of the complicated
reception of G. H. Mead’s ideas by ethnometodologists.  Queré’s argument is that the
willingness  by  ethnomethodologists  to  distance  themselves  from  symbolic
interactionists has contributed to prevent them from engaging more productively with
Mead,  the “founding father”  of  SI.  In  particular,  Queré directs  his  attention to  the
ethnometodologists’s critique of Mead’s social psychology alleged “externalism,” which
he  rightly  dismisses.  Queré’s  historical  journey  thus  helps  us  recall  one  important
truth, namely that disciplinary boundaries and allegiances can obfuscate or even block
otherwise  fruitful  encounters.  Mead’s  pragmatism  is  also  discussed  in  Mitchell
Aboulafia’s  “Through the  Eyes  of  Mad Men:  Simulation,  Interaction,  and  Ethics,”  a
critical re-examination of simulation theory, which has gained huge currency among
neuroscientists  as  a  way  of  explaining  how we attribute  mental  states  and predict
human  behavior.  Aboulafia’s  critical  engagement  with  simulation  theory  draws  on
Mead’s  theory  of  the  social  self  with  a  view  not  only  to  highlight  weaknesses  in
simulation  theory,  but  also  to  assist  in  addressing  ethical  questions  in  a  more
sophisticated and comprehensive way than simulation theory. Given the current buzz
around neurosciences, this is an important and timely discussion. The following paper,
“Between Political Inquiry and Democratic Faith: A Pragmatist Approach to Visualizing
Publics,” takes us to the field of political science. James Johnson’s starting point is the
1930s debate between Walter Lippmann and John Dewey on democracy. Johnson shares
the latter’s concern with the public dissemination of social and political knowledge,
which Dewey saw as one of the functions of a pragmatist science of politics. Johnson
pays particular attention to the conditions under which social and political research is
presented. He uses the example of the emergence of AIDS activism in the US during the
mid-1980s, in which a pragmatist preoccupation with rendering the epidemic and its
sources visible to the public could be discerned, to illustrate the claim that political
scientists have much to gain from an increased awareness of the importance of the
ways in which they presents  their  findings as  well  as  themselves.  The influence of
Dewey’s political pragmatism is also to be found in Kenneth Stikkers’s paper, “Dewey,
Economic  Democracy,  and  the  Mondragon  Cooperatives.”  The  key  insight  here
explored  is  the  application  of  Deweyan  radical  democratic  ideas  to  the  economic
sphere:  human  growth  vs.  economic  growth;  bottom-up,  evolutionary  economics
versus ideological, utopian economics; empirical, experimental science versus ideology
posing as “science.” But where can one find concrete applications of Dewey’s ideas in
the economic sphere? Certainly not in the US, where the economy is largely dominated
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by the principles of autocratic corporate governance; Stikkers’s alternative was to turn
to Europe in order to find an example of Deweyan economy. The example he finds is the
Mondragon Cooperative Corporation, a network of largely worker cooperatives in the
Basque  region  of  Spain.  The  Mondragon,  with  its  principles  of  workers  as  owners;
owners as workers; democratic governance; reasonable wage differentials; distribution
of profits according to a fixed formula; cooperation among cooperatives; distrust of
state interference; profit is not an end in itself, but a means to securing employment
and a better life for workers; environmental stewardship; and education for democratic
economic life, provides an excellent example of Deweyan economy, although neither
pragmatism  generally  nor  Dewey  in  particular  has  influenced  the  shaping  of  that
conglomerate. The last paper of this issue deals with the impact of pragmatist ideas
upon an entirely different domain, psychiatry. David H. Brendel’s “Can Patients And
Psychiatrists Be Friends? A Pragmatist Viewpoint” discusses how pragmatist ideas can
help  negotiate  the  tension  between  the  psychiatrists  and  patients  around  the
apparently but indeed central theme of friendship. The author’s “clinical pragmatism”
is  situated  between  modernist  and  postmodernist  accounts  of  truth,  action  and
pragmatism. The paper ends with an extension of the author’s early work concerning
the contribution of pragmatism for good psychiatric practice. As such, this will be of
interest to many outside humanities and the social sciences – and an added value to
this issue. 
9 The continued impact  of  pragmatist  philosophical  ideas  in  other  areas  of  scientific
inquiry,  throughout  the  twentieth  century  in  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic,  is  well
illustrated  in  the  various  papers  included  here.  From psychiatry  to  economics  and
political  science,  from  psychology  to  sociology,  there  were  numerous  encounters
between  that  philosophical  tradition  and  other  areas  of  social  scientific  research.
Granted,  there  is  room  for  improvement,  as  pragmatism  never  really  attained  the
status of mainstream influence in any of those disciplines. Yet the past decade has been
witness to a steady and consistent increase of the currency of pragmatist themes and
ideas in various fields, in particular in Europe. It is with a note of optimism that we
conclude this introduction and invite our readers to peruse into this issue as they will
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